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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Lance Raymond Selleck appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order entered upon his conviction for felony 
violation of a no contact order.    
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 In April 2016, Selleck was convicted of felony violation of a no contact order and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years with one year fixed. 
(R., pp.56-58.)  At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court ordered that Selleck 
have no contact with the victim, Chelaye Dodd, for 50 years, “thus expiring on April 6, 
2066.”  (Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.2 (via visual line count).)  Several weeks later, the court 
entered an Order for No Contact which stated:  “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
defendant shall have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on 
April 6, 2066.”  (R., pp.59-60.)   
 Selleck filed a Motion to Dismiss or Modify Order for No Contact, arguing that the 
district court’s order did not comply with the specific requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 
(R., pp.68-71), and the state filed an objection (R., pp.73-74).  At the end of a hearing, 
the district court denied Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order. 
(R., p.72; Tr., p.30, L.17 – p.31, L.24.)   
 Selleck filed a notice of appeal timely from the Order denying his motion to 







 Selleck states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Selleck’s motion 
to dismiss or modify the no contact order entered in this case?  
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
If this Court finds the district court erred by denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or 
modify the no contact order, should this case be remanded to the district court for 



























If This Court Finds The District Court Erred By Denying Selleck’s Motion To Dismiss Or 
Modify The No Contact Order, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court 
For Modification Of The No Contact Order    
 
A. Introduction 
Selleck argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
to dismiss or modify the no contact order.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-7.)  Selleck asserts 
that the district court failed to fully comply with I.C.R. 46.2 by omitting several required 
statements from the no contact order.  In the event this Court concludes that the district 
court erred by denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order, this 
case should be remanded to the district court to modify the no contact order to cure 
such error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 339 P.3d 1126 (2014) (quoting 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008)). 
 
C. To The Extent This Court Finds The No Contact Order Omitted Information 
Required By I.C.R. 46.2, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court 
For Modification Of The No Contact Order To Comply With That Rule   
 
 At the end of Selleck’s sentencing hearing, the district court ruled: 
I’m also going to order, Mr. Selleck, that you have no contact with the 
victim in this case for the next 50 years, and that any contact with her at 
any time in the next 50 years will result, once again, in a felony charge – I 
believe, is how the statute reads.  However, the no contact order remains 





(Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.2 (via visual line count).)  Several weeks later, the court 
entered an Order for No Contact which fully stated:  “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
defendant shall have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on 
April 6, 2066.”  (R., pp.59-60.)   
 Selleck filed a Motion to Dismiss or Modify Order for No Contact, arguing, in the 
main, that the district court’s 50-year expiration period went beyond its jurisdictional 
authority, which, he argued, should have been limited to the maximum possible 
sentence for the offense – five years.  (R., pp.68-71.)  Selleck’s motion also contended 
the district court’s order did not comply with the specific requirements of I.C.R. 46.2, 
because it lacked the following mandatory statements or information:  (1) a distance 
restriction, (2) a statement that, as an alternative to a specific expiration date, the order 
would expire “upon dismissal of the case,” (3) any of the three advisories under 
subsection (a)(4), and (4) an indication that the written order was served on or signed 
by Selleck.  (R., pp.68-71.)   
 During a hearing on Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order, 
the attorneys and the district court focused on Selleck’s argument that the 50-year 
expiration date went beyond the court’s jurisdictional authority, which, Selleck 
contended, should be limited to the five-year maximum statutory sentence for felony 
violation of a no contact order.1  (See generally R., pp.24-32.)  At the end of the hearing, 
the court ruled: (1) the 50-year no contact provision complied with I.C.R. 46.2 because it 
provided a specific time frame for the order, (2) the court’s jurisdiction to order no 
contact with the victim was not limited by the five-year maximum sentence for the no 
                                                 
1  Selleck was not present during the hearing on his motion to dismiss or modify the no 




contact order offense, and (3) Selleck had notice of the provisions of the no contact 
order because it was pronounced in open court when he was sentenced.  (Tr., p.30, 
L.17 – p.31, L.24.)  The court entered an Order denying Selleck’s motion.  (R., p.72.)  
 On appeal, and in contrast to the main argument he presented to the district 
court (see generally R., pp.68-71; Tr., pp.24-32), Selleck does not argue that the 50-
year life of the no contact order went beyond the time limits of the court’s jurisdiction 
(see Appellant’s Brief, p.4 n.4).  Instead, Selleck argues that the court abused its 
discretion by failing to modify its no contact order in compliance with I.C.R. 46.2(a) to 
include:  (1) a statement that it would expire upon dismissal of the case (as an 
alternative to the expiration date), (2) an advisory that a violation of the order may be 
prosecuted as a separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an 
appearance before a judge, (3) a statement that the order can only be modified by a 
judge, (4) an advisory that where more than one protective order is in place, the most 
restrictive provisions will control if any of the terms are in conflict, and (5) verification 
that the written order was served on or signed by Selleck.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-7); 
see I.C.R. 46.2(a).   
 The district court issued the no contact order at issue in this case pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-920(1).  The procedural requirements applicable to such no contact orders are 
set forth in I.C.R. 46.2, which provides, in relevant part: 
(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in 
writing and served on or signed by the defendant.  Each judicial district 
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that 
district.  No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following 
information: 





 (2) A distance restriction; 
 (3) That the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, 
 or upon dismissal of the case; 
 (4) An advisory that: 
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a 
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail 
will be set until an appearance before a judge, and 
the possible penalties for this crime, 
(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a 
judge, 
(c) When more than one domestic violence protection 
order is in place, the most restrictive provision will 
control any conflicting terms of any other civil or 
criminal protection order. 
 As Selleck acknowledges on appeal, the no contact order in this case complies 
with I.C.R. 46.2 “in that it contains the case number . . . , the defendant’s name . . . , the 
protected person’s name . . . , and the expiration date . . . .”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)  
Contrary to Selleck’s assertions, the no contact order also complies with at least three 
additional aspects of I.C.R. 46.2(a).  First, because the court ordered that Selleck “shall 
have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on April 6, 2066” 
(R., p.59), the order complies with I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3), and any need to alternatively 
advise Selleck that the order would expire “upon dismissal of the case” was rendered 
moot.  Next, in regard to the initial part of I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4)(a), during his sentencing 
hearing, the district court informed Selleck that any contact with the victim “at any time 
in the next 50 years will result, once again, in a felony charge[.]”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.20–24.)  




because it was announced in open court in his presence during his sentencing hearing.  
(Tr., p.31, Ls.6-8; see id., p.21, Ls.20-24.)      
In regard to the remaining allegations that the no contact order did not comply 
with I.C.R. 46.2(a) – i.e., the subsection (a)(2) distance restriction and the three-part 
advisory required under subsection (a)(4) – should this Court conclude that the no 
contact order failed to include one or more mandatory provisions, this case should be 
remanded to the district court to modify the no contact order appropriately.  Idaho 
Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  Here, any omission of any 
of the required statements or information set forth in I.C.R. 46.2 is easily remedied by 
modification of the no contact order on remand to the district court, and none of 
Selleck’s substantial rights could have been affected due to the no contact order’s non-
compliance with the rule, nor has Selleck suggested otherwise.  (See generally 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order to the extent the no 
contact order complies with I.C.R. 46.2, and, to the extent appropriate, remand for 
modification of the no contact order to conform to that rule.  
 DATED this 9th day of May, 2017. 
              
             
      _/s/ John C. McKinney________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
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